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Abstract— This paper presents some results related to the
detection and isolation of cyber attacks in a recently proposed
benchmark based on a two-tank system. The benchmark
proposes some attack scenarios in which a malicious attacker
alters the signals of the water level sensors in the tanks, in
order to remain hidden while stealing water. This paper shows
the difficulty to detect cyber attacks based only on the model-
based residuals calculated using the measured variables. On the
other hand, by using the time evolution pattern analysis of the
measured sensors, it becomes possible to detect some of these
cyber attacks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the increasing integration between control,
communication and computation (the so-called triple C) has
provided the ability for large numbers of interconnected
sensors, actuators and computational units to interact with
the physical environment [1]. The merging of cyber elements
with physical processes has led to investigate a new class of
systems, referred to as cyber-physical systems (CPSs) [2].
CPSs are characterized by a higher efficiency, but also by
bigger vulnerabilities, which can be exploited by a malicious
agent in order to perform cyber attacks, which might result
in critical damage or economical loss [3], [4]. Cyber attacks
are different from faults due to the fact that they do not affect
only the physical layer of the CPS, but the cyber one as well.
In order to make a control system resilient in face of such
attacks, attack detection and secure control techniques must
be developed [5], [6].
These attacks, usually motivated by terrorism, criminality
or sabotage, exploit the system’s vulnerabilities and result
in some kind of disturbance or damage in the physical
and cyber layers. The interconnected nature of Industry
4.0-driven operations means that cyber attacks have far
more extensive effects than ever before, and digital control
systems, computers and their supply networks may not be
prepared for this kind of risks [7], [8].
In [9], a benchmark based on a two-tank interconnected
system was proposed for testing different schemes for detec-
tion and isolation of cyber attacks. The benchmark was ob-
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tained from a previously proposed fault diagnosis benchmark
[10]–[12] by incorporating a malicious attacker who wants
to steal water from the tanks while remaining hidden through
an appropriate alteration of the measurements coming from
the level sensors of the tanks.
This paper presents the application of the classical fault
diagnosis approach based on analytical redundancy relations
(ARRs) [13], and how an analysis of the time evolution
pattern of the measured sensors can be used to improve
the ability to detect cyber attacks. ARRs are analytical
expressions in terms of the system’s input, output and
their derivatives, which allow testing the consistency of the
measured signal with the nominal model of the system. Their
generation is a problem that has attracted a lot of attention
since the late 1990s [14], and it is still of interest nowadays
[15]–[17], due to several applications of ARRs in different
fields, such as electromechanical systems [18], automotive
[19] and wind turbines [20].
On the other hand, pattern analysis uses a representation
of signal trends in order to extract features which allow
inferring the state of a process [21], e.g., whether it is
being affected or not by faults. Different approaches can be
applied to this aim, such as wavelet-based methodologies
[22], Fischer discriminant analysis [23], or cumulative sum
charts [24], [25].
This paper is structured as follows: Section II summarizes
the benchmark description while the considered scenarios
are described in Section III. The results of application of the
attack detection methods are presented in Section IV. Finally,
in Section V, the conclusions are drawn.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE BENCHMARK
The considered benchmark consists of two coupled water
tanks, which are connected to each other through connecting
pipes controlled with an automatic valve Vb regulated by an
On-Off controller (see Fig. 1). The first tank, denoted as
T1, receives water from the pump P1, which is controlled
by a proportional-integral (PI) controller. The second tank,
denoted as T2, is equipped with an outlet electro-valve Vo to
supply water to the consumers.
The benchmark model has been derived from the one
described in [10] by incorporating a possible malicious
attacker who has the goal of stealing water from the tanks
while going unnoticed thanks to appropriate alterations of
the outputs of the sensors, which hide the attacks. In the
modified benchmark, it is assumed that the thief can extract
water from the tanks using extraction pumps with flow rates























Fig. 1. Two-tank benchmark.
to the theft tanks Tf 1 and Tf 2, respectively. At the same time,
it is assumed that the signals provided by the sensors are sent
by wireless to the PI and On-Off controller, and the thief is
able to hack these signals and modify them. Depending on
the type of theft and the type of sensor alteration, different
attack scenarios are considered, as described in Section III.
Hereafter, the model of the benchmark is described and
Table I presents the model parameters. Additionally, the
benchmark simulator provides complementary information
about the amount of stolen water volumes Vf 1 and Vf 2 in
tanks Tf 1 and Tf 2, respectively, and the real values of the
water levels h1 and h2. However, these variables should be
assumed not to be available to the attack detector.
TABLE I
MODEL VARIABLES AND PROCESS PARAMETERS.
Symbol Description Value Units
Cvb Hydraulic flow coefficient of the valve Vb 1.5938∗10−4 m3/2/s
Cvo Hydraulic flow coefficient of the valve Vo 1.59640∗10−4 m3/2/s
Ai(i=1,2) Cross-section of the cylindric tank Ti 1.54 ·10−2 m2
hi(i=1,2) Water level in the tank Ti variable m
hi,max(i=1,2) Maximum water level in the tank Ti 0.6 m
Qp,max Maximum outflow from the pump P1 0.01 m3/s
Q f i(i=1,2) Flow theft from tanks T1 and T2 under attack 10-4 m3/s
h1,re f Set point of the PI level controller 0.5 m
A. Model of the interconnected tanks
The variation of V1 and V2, which are the water volumes
in T1 and T2, respectively, can be calculated from the balance
mass equations
V̇i(t) = Aiḣi(t) = ∑Qin,i(t)−∑Qout,i(t), i = 1,2 (1)
where Ai denotes the cross-section area of the tank Ti, ∑Qin,i
is the sum of all the water inflows into the tank Ti and ∑Qout,i
is the sum of all the water outflows from the tank Ti.
In particular, (1) can be rewritten as
A1ḣ1(t) = Qp(t)−Q12(t)−Q f 1(t) (2)
A2ḣ2(t) = Q12(t)−Qo(t)−Q f 2(t) (3)
with Q f 1 = Q f 2 = 0 when no attack is performed on the
system.
B. Model of the electro-valve Vo
The water outflow Qo is controlled by a valve Vo, which
is open in nominal regime, where Cvo is the global hydraulic
flow coefficient of the valve Vo, and Uo ∈ {0,1} is the valve




C. Model of the valve Vb
The water flow Q12 through the valve Vb is controlled






It is assumed that the available measurements are given
by
ymx (t) = yx(t)+ εyx(t) (6)
where yx ∈ {Qp,Up,h1,h2,Ub,Uo} are the measured vari-
ables, and εyx denotes the corresponding measurement noise.
The values of the sensors noises of this benchmark1 are
provided in the file init.m, located in the directory Bench-
mark Program Simulation, and are obtained as uniformly
distributed signals.
E. PI controller
The water level of the tank T1, denoted as h1, is regulated
by a PI controller, whose output is given by
Ump (t) = KP (h1,re f −h1(t))+KI
∫ t
0
(h1,re f −hm1 (τ))dτ (7)
where h1,re f = 0.5m is the set-point for hm1 , while the
proportional and integral gains of the controller are chosen
as KP = 10−3 m−1 and KI = 5 ·10−6 (m · s)−1, respectively.
F. On-Off controller
The water level h2 is regulated by an On-Off controller
with hysteresis with 0.09 m and 0.11 m as lower and upper
switching points, respectively.
G. Pump model
Qp is the outflow from the pump P1, which is assumed to
be proportional to the PI controller output Up. Taking into
account that the flow from the pump is limited by physical
constraints, modeled as a standard saturation nonlinearity,
then Qp is given by
Qp(t) =
 Up(t) i f 0 <Up(t)< Qp,max0 i f Up(t)≤ 0Qp,max i f Up(t)≥ Qp,max (8)
1The benchmark is available at the URL https://cs2ac.upc.edu/en/training-
benchmarks/cyber-attacks-benchmark-simulator
III. SCENARIOS OF CYBER ATTACKS
A number of attacks are considered, covering different
attack policies. This section presents the different kinds of
scenerios of cyber attacks.
Scenario 1 - Attackless mode: This scenario corresponds
to the normal behavior of the two-tank system when nobody
is stealing water.
Scenario 2 - Short-term water theft from T1: This
scenario is similar to a leakage fault, the only remarkable
difference being that it is cast maliciously, with the purpose
of stealing water from the tank T1. In this scenario, a pump
extracts a constant flow Q f 1 = 10−4 m3/s between t = 40s
and t = 80s without any alteration of the measurements hm1
and hm2 .
Note that in this scenario, the residuals behave similarly
to the case of a sudden leak in the original fault diagnosis
benchmark.
Scenario 3 - Short-term water theft from T1 with hiding
signal added to the measurement hm1 : In this scenario,
the thief uses a pump to extract water with a constant flow
Q f 1 = 10−4 m3/s between t = 40s and t = 80s while adding
a signal to the output of the level sensor in tank T1 so that the
introduced signal hides the theft. Thanks to the introduced
signal, the water level in tank T1 seems to remain constant,
and the PI controller works as if nothing had happened
providing almost the same value Ump as in Scenario 1. In
particular, the modified value of hm1 is given by





Q f 1(τ)dτ (9)
Scenario 4 - Long-term water theft from T1 with hiding
signal added to the measurement hm1 : This attack scenario
is similar to Scenario 3, but the theft duration is extended
from 40s to 120s. Due to the large quantity of stolen water,
the plant exhibits some physical functioning problems, since
the tank T1 is emptied out, affecting the tank T2 due to the
interconnection, and the consumption of water Qo, which
becomes zero.
Scenario 5 - Long-term water theft from T1 with small
signal added to the measurement hm1 : In this scenario,
the thief will steal water as in the previous scenarios while
adding a signal that deceives the PI controller to force more
water to be pumped inside the system while making harder
to detect the theft. In particular, the modified value of hm1 is
given by





0.5Q f 1(τ)dτ (10)
Scenario 6 - Short-term water theft from T2: This attack
scenario is similar to Scenario 2, but it affects T2 instead of
T1.
Scenario 7 - Short-term water theft from T2 with hiding
signal added to the measurement hm2 : This attack scenario
is similar to Scenario 3, but it affects T2 instead of T1. In this
case, the thief uses a pump to extract water with a constant
flow Q f 2 = 10−4 m3/s while adding a signal to the output of
the level sensor in tank T2, which forces the On-Off controller
to act on the interconnecting valve Vb as if nothing had
happened. In particular, the modified value of hm2 is given
by





Q f 2(τ)dτ (11)
Scenario 8 - Long-term water theft from T2 with hiding
signal added to the measurement hm2 : This scenario is
similar to Scenario 4, but the pump corresponding to Q f 2
is used by the thief instead of the one corresponding to Q f 1.
Scenario 9 - Long-term water theft from T2 with small
signal added to the measurement hm2 : This scenario is
similar to Scenario 5, but the thief steals water from the
tank T2 and the introduced signal is meant to deceive the
ON-OFF controller instead. In this case, the modified value
of hm2 is given by





0.5Q f 2(τ)dτ (12)
Scenario 10 - Replay attack: In this scenario, the thief
steals water when the plant has reached its steady-state.
However, before doing so, he/she records the measurements
coming from the sensors without stealing water from the
tanks. Then, in a subsequent phase of the attack, the thief
steals water while replacing the real data with the recorded
one. More specifically, the water is stolen from t = 160s to
t = 200s, while measurements recorded in the 50s previous
to the attack are used to deceive the controller and the
supervision system. At time t = 200s, the replay attack ends
and the controller and the supervision system are able to see
the real data coming from the system.
IV. RESULTS OF TWO METHODS FOR CYBER ATTACK
DETECTION
This section presents two methods to detect the cyber
attacks of this benchmark. One of the method is based
on model-based fault diagnosis using analytical redundancy
relations: the well-known ARRs [13] and the second method
relies on extracting some features from the time response of
the sensors.
A. Results based on analytical redundancy relations
Based on the available sensors and replacing the equations
of the model described in Section III, four possible analytical
redundancy relations (ARRs) can be derived replacing the
physical variables by the real measured signals and using the
perfect matching approach [17]. These ARRs allow deriving





































Ump (t) i f 0 <U
m
p (t)< Qp,max
0 i f Ump (t)≤ 0
Qp,max i f Ump (t)≥ Qp,max
(16)
The residuals (13)-(16) are expressed in discrete-time by
applying an Euler discretization with sampling time Ts = 1s.
Figs. 2-5 show the results of the residual r1 for Scenarios
2, 3, 4 and 5 in order to detect an attack in the tank T1. The
threshold has been calculated as three times the standard
deviation of the residual in Scenario 1 (i.e., the attackless
scenario).
Clearly, in Scenarios 2 and 4, the attacks can be detected
analyzing the residual r1 but, in Scenarios 3 and 5, the resid-
ual r1 appears to be insensitive, such that the corresponding
attacks cannot be detected.




















Fig. 2. Residual r1(t) in Scenario 2.
B. Results based on some features of the temporal pattern
of the sensors
A possible approach to improve the detectability of the
cyber attacks consists in analyzing the signals coming from
the sensors in the scenarios where the analytical residuals are
inefficient for this task, as Scenarios 3 and 5. Fig. 6 presents
the time evolution of the measured level in tank T1 during
Scenario 1 (attackless) and the real evolution of the water
level during Scenario 3. The difference between the real and
measured level y1 in the tank T1 is due to the water stolen
during this attack. On the other hand, the fast oscillation of
hm1 without any attack is due to the fast switching On-Off of




















Fig. 3. Residual r1(t) in Scenario 3.





















Fig. 4. Residual r1(t) in Scenario 4.




















Fig. 5. Residual r1(t) in Scenario 5.
the interconnected pipe to maintain the level in the tank T2
around 0.09 and 0.11 meters (see Fig. 7).
However, the oscillation of hm1 in Scenario 3 is much
slower due to the lower difference between the levels of tanks
T1 and T2 such that more time is necessary to refill the tank
T2. This feature of the signals hm1 or h
m
2 could be exploited
to detect an attack. In particular, analyzing the frequency
oscillation of hm2 in Fig. 7, the time to detect a misbehavior
(an attack in this scenario) can be shortened significantly.
The same situation is found in Scenario 5 (see Fig. 8) and
the interesting feature is that the smaller oscillations of these
signals start when the attack is developed and remains at
this low oscillation frequency until the end of the scenario
because of the water theft and the low level in tank T1.
Table II shows the difference in the oscillation frequency
of hm2 for the Scenarios 1, 3 and 5. Clearly, this feature is an
interesting and complementary information that can be used
in order to detect these attacks.
TABLE II
OSCILLATION OF THE hm2 IN SEVERAL SCENARIOS.
Scenario 1 3 5
Freq. oscillation hm2 1/12 Hz 1/49 Hz < 1/35 Hz



































Fig. 6. Pattern time evolution of the measured water level hm1 in Scenarios
1 and 3.
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has presented some results related to the detec-
tion and isolation of cyber attacks using a recently proposed
benchmark based on a two-tank system. The benchmark
has proposed some attack scenarios in which a malicious
attacker alters the signals of the water level sensors in the
tanks, in order to remain hidden while stealing water. Results
in five of these scenarios have been presented showing the
difficulty to detect cyber attacks based only on the model-
based residuals calculated using the measured variables, and
how using the time evolution pattern analysis of the measured
sensors, it becomes possible detect some of these cyber
attacks. As future research, the remaining five scenarios will
be considered.



































Fig. 7. Pattern time evolution of the measured water level hm2 in Scenarios
1 and 3.


































Fig. 8. Pattern time evolution of the measured water level hm2 in Scenarios
1 and 5.
REFERENCES
[1] S. Graham and P. Kumar, “The convergence of control, communica-
tion, and computation,” in IFIP International Conference on Personal
Wireless Communications. Springer, 2003, pp. 458–475.
[2] P. Antsaklis, “Goals and challenges in cyber-physical systems research
editorial of the editor in chief,” IEEE Transactions on Automatic
Control, vol. 59, no. 12, pp. 3117–3119, 2014.
[3] F. Pasqualetti, F. Dörfler, and F. Bullo, “Attack detection and identi-
fication in cyber-physical systems,” IEEE transactions on automatic
control, vol. 58, no. 11, pp. 2715–2729, 2013.
[4] S. Jeschke, C. Brecher, T. Meisen, D. Özdemir, and T. Eschert,
“Industrial internet of things and cyber manufacturing systems,” in
Industrial Internet of Things. Springer, 2017, pp. 3–19.
[5] H. S. Sánchez, D. Rotondo, T. Escobet, V. Puig, J. Saludes, and
J. Quevedo, “Detection of replay attacks in cyber-physical systems
using a frequency-based signature,” Journal of the Franklin Institute,
vol. 356, no. 5, pp. 2798–2824, 2019.
[6] D. Rotondo, H. S. Sánchez, V. Puig, T. Escobet, and J. Quevedo, “A
virtual actuator approach for the secure control of networked LPV
systems under pulse-width modulated dos attacks,” Neurocomputing,
2019.
[7] L. Armesto, L. Arnal-Benedicto, J. F. Dols Ruiz, V. Girbés, and J. C.
Peris, “Proyecto safebus: Sistemas avanzados de seguridad integral
en autobuses,” Revista Iberoamericana de Automática e Informática
Industrial (RIAI), vol. 13, no. 1, pp. 103–114, 2016.
[8] R. Waslo, T. Lewis, R. Hajj, and R. Carton, “Industry 4.0 and
cybersecurity: Managing risk in an age of connected production,”
2017.
[9] J. Quevedo, H. Sánchez, D. Rotondo, T. Escobet, and V. Puig, “A two-
tank benchmark for detection and isolation of cyber attacks,” IFAC-
PapersOnLine, vol. 51, no. 24, pp. 770–775, 2018.
[10] B. O. Bouamama, R. M. Alaoui, P. Taillibert, and M. Staroswiecki,
“Diagnosis of a two-tank system,” Internal report of CHEM-project
USTL Lille, France, Tech. Rep., 2001.
[11] B. O. Bouamama, A. K. Samantaray, K. Medjaher, M. Staroswiecki,
and G. Dauphin-Tanguy, “Model builder using functional and bond
graph tools for FDI design,” Control Engineering Practice, vol. 13,
no. 7, pp. 875–891, 2005.
[12] X. Zhang, “Structural analysis for diagnosis of a two-tank system,”
in Pervasive Computing and Applications (ICPCA), 2010 5th Interna-
tional Conference on. IEEE, 2010, pp. 273–276.
[13] M. Staroswiecki and G. Comtet-Varga, “Analytical redundancy rela-
tions for fault detection and isolation in algebraic dynamic systems,”
Automatica, vol. 37, no. 5, pp. 687–699, 2001.
[14] D. Maquin, V. Cocquempot, J.-P. Cassar, M. Staroswiecki, and
J. Ragot, “Generation of analytical redundancy relations for FDI pur-
poses,” in IFAC Symposium on Diagnostics for Electrical Machines,
Power Electronics and Drives, SDEMPED’97, 1997, pp. 86–93.
[15] S. Tornil-Sin, C. Ocampo-Martinez, V. Puig, and T. Escobet, “Robust
fault diagnosis of nonlinear systems using interval constraint satis-
faction and analytical redundancy relations,” IEEE Transactions on
Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems, vol. 44, no. 1, pp. 18–29,
2014.
[16] A. Termeche, D. Benazzouz, B. O. Bouamama, and I. Abdallah,
“Augmented analytical redundancy relations to improve the fault
isolation,” Mechatronics, vol. 55, pp. 129–140, 2018.
[17] J. Lunze, “A method to get analytical redundancy relations for fault
diagnosis,” IFAC-PapersOnLine, vol. 50, no. 1, pp. 1006–1012, 2017.
[18] M. Yu, C. Xiao, W. Jiang, S. Yang, and H. Wang, “Fault diagnosis
for electromechanical system via extended analytical redundancy re-
lations,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, vol. 14, no. 12,
pp. 5233–5244, 2018.
[19] H. Shui, S. Duan, C. Sankavaram, and J. Ni, “A nonlinear analyti-
cal redundancy method for sensor fault diagnosis in an automotive
application,” in PHM Society Conference, vol. 10, no. 1, 2018.
[20] H. Sanchez, T. Escobet, V. Puig, and P. F. Odgaard, “Fault diagnosis
of an advanced wind turbine benchmark using interval-based ARRs
and observers,” IEEE Transactions on Industrial Electronics, vol. 62,
no. 6, pp. 3783–3793, 2015.
[21] M. R. Maurya, R. Rengaswamy, and V. Venkatasubramanian, “Fault
diagnosis using dynamic trend analysis: A review and recent devel-
opments,” Engineering Applications of artificial intelligence, vol. 20,
no. 2, pp. 133–146, 2007.
[22] F. Akbaryan and P. Bishnoi, “Fault diagnosis of multivariate systems
using pattern recognition and multisensor data analysis technique,”
Computers & Chemical Engineering, vol. 25, no. 9-10, pp. 1313–
1339, 2001.
[23] X. Yang, S. Rui, X. Zhang, S. Xu, C. Yang, and P. X. Liu, “Fault
diagnosis in chemical processes based on class-incremental FDA and
PCA,” IEEE Access, vol. 7, pp. 18 164–18 171, 2019.
[24] L. Zhang, X. Ma, J. Hu, S. Dong, and A. Palazoglu, “Formulation of a
new trend cumulative sum chart to monitor batch process variables,”
Industrial & Engineering Chemistry Research, vol. 57, no. 18, pp.
6303–6316, 2018.
[25] J. Rubio-Hernan, L. De Cicco, and J. Garcia-Alfaro, “On the use of
watermark-based schemes to detect cyber-physical attacks,” EURASIP
Journal on Information Security, no. 8, 2017.
View publication stats
